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Abstract
A robust feature of the corporate growth process is the Laplace, or symmetric exponential,
distribution of ﬁrm growth rates. In this paper, we sketch out a class of simple theoretical models
capable of explaining this empirical regularity. We do not attempt to generalize on where growth
opportunities come from, but rather we focus on how ﬁrms build upon growth opportunities.
We borrow ideas from the self-organizing criticality literature to explain how the interdependent
nature of discrete resources may lead to the triggering oﬀ of a series of additions to a ﬁrm’s
resources. In a ﬁrst formal model we consider the case of employment growth in a hierarchy,
and observe that growth rates follow an exponential distribution. In a second model we include
plant and capital as resources and we are able to reproduce a number of stylized facts about ﬁrm
growth.
A LA RECHERCHE D’UNE EXPLICATION DE LA DISTRIBUTION EXPONENTIELLE
DES TAUX DE CROISSANCE DES FIRMES
R´ esum´ e: Les taux de croissance des ﬁrmes sont g´ en´ eralement distribu´ es selon une loi exponen-
tielle. Cette r´ egularit´ e empirique a ´ et´ e v´ eriﬁ´ ee pour plusieurs bases de donn´ ees et ` a plusieurs
niveaux d’agr´ egation. Dans ce papier, nous proposons un mod` ele th´ eorique simple qui est capable
de reproduire cette distribution exponentielle. Nous ne tentons aucune g´ en´ eralisation relative aux
causes d’apparition des opportunit´ es de croissance, mais nous nous attachons plutˆ ot au comment
les ﬁrmes r´ eagissent et internalisent ces opportunit´ es. Nous utilisons des concepts issus de la
∗Thanks go to Giulio Bottazzi, David Br´ ee, Thomas Brenner, Mike Dietrich, Giovanni Dosi, Davide Fiaschi,
Ricardo Mamede, Luigi Marengo, Rosanna Nistic` o, Bernard Paulr´ e, Rekha Rao, Giorgio Ricchiuti, Angelo
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Relationships among Firms and Competitiveness’ in Lucca, January 2007; and the Econophysics conference
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applies.
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8litt´ erature sur la ‘criticit´ e’ auto-organisatrice pour expliquer comment la nature interd´ ependante
de ressources discr` etes peut d´ eclencher toute une s´ erie d’additions aux ressources d’une ﬁrme.
Dans un premier mod` ele, nous consid´ erons le cas de la croissance en termes d’emploi dans le con-
texte d’une hi´ erarchie, et nous observons que les taux de croissance suivent une loi exponentielle.
Dans un deuxi` eme mod` ele, nous incluons les ´ etablissements et les machines comme ressources,
et le mod` ele est capable de reproduire plusieurs faits stylis´ es sur la croissance des ﬁrmes.
JEL codes: L1, C1
Keywords: Firm growth rates, Exponential distribution, Hierarchy, Growth autocorrela-
tion









































It has long been known that the distribution of ﬁrm growth rates is fat-tailed. In an early
contribution, Ashton (1926) considers the growth patterns of British textile ﬁrms and ob-
serves that: “In their growth they obey no one law. A few apparently undergo a steady
expansion...With others, increase in size takes place by a sudden leap...” (Ashton (1926)
pp. 572-573). Little dedicates a section of his 1962 empirical study to the distribution of
growth rates, and also ﬁnds that the distribution is fat-tailed. However, he concludes the
section without proposing any theoretical explanation: “I do not know what plausible hy-
pothesis explains the highly leptokurtic nature of the distributions” (Little (1962) p. 408).
Recent empirical research into industrial dynamics has discovered that the distribution of ﬁrm
growth rates closely follows the Laplace distribution, also known as the symmetric exponential
distribution. Using the Compustat database of US manufacturing ﬁrms, Stanley et al. (1996)
and Amaral et al. (1997) observe a ‘tent-shaped’ distribution characterized by a straight line
on logarithmic plots that corresponds to the Laplace density. The Laplace distribution is also
found to be a rather useful heuristic when considering growth rates of ﬁrms in the worldwide
pharmaceutical industry (Bottazzi et al. (2001). Giulio Bottazzi and coauthors extend these
ﬁndings by considering the Laplace density in the wider context of the family of Subbotin
distributions. They ﬁnd that, for the Compustat database, the Laplace is indeed a suitable
distribution for modelling ﬁrm growth rates, at both aggregate and disaggregated levels of
analysis (Bottazzi and Secchi (2003a)). The Laplacian nature of the distribution of growth
rates also holds for other databases, such as Italian manufacturing (Bottazzi et al. (2007)).1 In
addition, the Laplace distribution appears to hold across a variety of ﬁrm growth indicators,
such as Sales growth, employment growth or Value Added growth (Bottazzi et al. (2007)). The
growth rates of French manufacturing ﬁrms have also been studied, and roughly speaking a
similar shape was observed, although it must be said that the empirical density was noticeably
fatter-tailed than the Laplace (Bottazzi et al. (2008)).2 In Figure 1, we use the Compustat
database to show the heavy-tailed distribution of annual employment growth rates for large
US ﬁrms.
In this paper, we argue that it would be fruitful to conceive ﬁrms as being composed
of discrete, interrelated resources, that are subject to local interactions, and susceptible to
containing some degree of organizational slack. We sketch out two similar theoretical models
that rely on these characteristics of ﬁrms to explain a number of ‘stylized facts’ of ﬁrm growth.
1Reichstein and Jensen (2005) investigate the growth rate distribution of Danish ﬁrms, and, unlike most
previous work, they observe asymmetries in the growth rate distribution, such that the Laplace is a better ﬁt
to the upper tail than the lower tail of the growth rate distribution.
2i.e. the observed subbotin b parameter (the ‘shape’ parameter) is signiﬁcantly lower than the Laplace value
of 1. This highlights the importance of following Bottazzi et al. (2002) and considering the Laplace as a special








































8Figure 1: The empirical distribution of employment growth rates, elaborated by the author
using the Compustat dataset for large US ﬁrms. Note the log scale on the y-axis. Employment
growth is calculated in the usual way of taking log-diﬀerences of total employment in successive
periods. Annual employment growth rates are calculated for the periods 1980-81, 1990-91 and
2000-01, obtaining 5256, 5931 and 7948 observations respectively. For each period, ﬁrms are
sorted into 100 bins.
In section 2 we review and discuss previous models of industry growth. Section 3 contains
a discussion whereby we identify some features common to ﬁrms – i.e. ﬁrms can be seen
as composed of lumpy, indivisible resources that are subject to non-linear interactions. In
Section 4 we present a simple model of employment growth in a hierarchical organization.
Section 5 contains a model that is computationally rather complex, the properties of which
we explore using simulation analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Discussion of Previous Models
There is something of a tradition in Industrial Organization modelling to represent growth
processes in purely stochastic terms. Ijiri and Simon (1977) oﬀered an explanation of the
skewed ﬁrm size distribution in terms of a random process in which the probability of a ﬁrm
taking up an additional business opportunity is conditional upon its size. This model, dubbed
the ‘island’ model because of the independent arrival of the growth opportunities, has been
widely accepted, and interest in it was recently revived by Sutton (1998).








































8taken the approach of stochastic explanations. Amaral et al. (1997) develop a model in which
the emergence of the distribution rests on a particular speciﬁcation of the functional form of the
stochastic growth process. However, there is little justiﬁcation of the choice of such a functional
form, and so their model appears to be more of a tautology than an explanation. The model
in Bottazzi and Secchi (2003b) and Bottazzi and Secchi (2006a) also conceives of ﬁrm growth
as a random process – “in our model luck is the principal factor that ﬁnally distinguishes
winners from losers among the contenders” (Bottazzi and Secchi (2006a)). The allocation
of growth opportunities is governed by the ‘Polya Urn’ statistics, and as a justiﬁcation of
such mathematical apparatus they evoke the principle of ‘increasing returns to growth’ in the
competitive process (more in the sense of Arthur (1989) rather than in that of the Kaldor-
Verdoorn ‘dynamic increasing returns’). Within the period of a calendar year, they suppose
that the probability of a growth opportunity being taken up depends positively on the number
of growth opportunities already taken up that year. This hypothesis, however, is diﬃcult to
reconcile with the existence of a small negative year-on-year autocorrelation of growth rates
observed in many empirical studies.3 Furthermore, given that the resulting distribution is
determined by the choice of the underlying stochastic process, there are limits to how much
such models can actually ‘explain’.
The choice of stochastic models to describe industrial evolution bears witness to a reluc-
tance to generalize across ﬁrms. Firms grow for a wide variety of diﬀerent reasons, they are
indeed heterogeneous, and it is believed that the best or only way to model growth may be
by treating it as purely stochastic. To move beyond describing industry dynamics in terms of
purely random shocks, we need to address the following question: “Can we generalize across
ﬁrms?” Our answer is: “Yes we can, to some degree”.
Without denying the complexity of commercial organizations or the heterogeneity that
exists between ﬁrms from diﬀerent sectors of the economy, we maintain that there are some
general features that are present in ﬁrms. (Indeed, Simon (1962) suggests that there are some
broad features that appear to be common not only to all ﬁrms but to all complex systems!)
The theoretical explanation proposed here is rooted in the ‘resource-based approach’, which
views ﬁrms as being composed of discrete, complementary resources (Penrose (1959)). In
addition, we allow for the possibility of growth being accommodated by organizational slack.
Organizational slack is a widely-recognized characteristic of business ﬁrms – indeed, a ﬁrm’s
resources will not be fully utilized at any given time for a number of reasons.4 However,
3For a detailed survey of growth rate autocorrelation, see Coad (2007).
4Here are a few possible examples. Slack may be present because indivisibilities of key inputs may prevent
a ﬁrm from attaining perfect productive eﬃciency. Also, slack may creep in as the learning-by-doing eﬀects
that increase a worker’s productivity are not counterbalanced by increasing demands made of the worker.
Furthermore, slack may be necessary because ﬁrms must be able to adapt and act ﬂexibly in response to








































8managers will seek to use a ﬁrm’s resources eﬃciently, to have them as close as possible to
‘full utilization’. If a ﬁrm’s resources are under-utilized, then growth can feed oﬀ these slack
resources.5 On the other hand, if resources are already more or less fully employed, then
growth will only be possible with the addition of new resources. In the former case, growth
requires no additional investment, whilst in the latter case, ﬁrm growth will be accompanied
by potentially wide-scale investment.6 This depiction of ﬁrm growth can be expressed in
terms of self-organizing criticality. The ﬁrm can be seen as a system which tends to a ‘critical
state’ of full utilization of its resources, as managers strive to organize the ﬁrms resources
eﬃciently within the ﬁrm’s hierarchical framework. Depending upon the criticality of the
system, the addition of an activity during growth will result in a (marginally) increased strain
for many associated resources, thus potentially triggering oﬀ a chain reaction of subsequent
growth across the whole of the organization. In this vein, Dixon comments on the criticality
of a ﬁrm at a more general level: “the later addition of one person to regular activities can
bring into operation a chain of reactions in the form of salaried employee increases, salary
increases, and ﬁxed asset additions” (Dixon, 1953, p. 50). Similarly, Hannan writes: “changes
in one organizational feature often generate cascades of additional changes, because of the
interdependence among parts of an organization” (Hannan, 2005, p. 61). Weick and Quinn
put it this way: “Small changes can be decisive if they occur on the edge of chaos... in
interconnected systems, there is no such thing as marginal change” (Weick and Quinn, 1999,
p. 378). The ‘avalanche’ will only stop if there is suﬃcient slack capacity to absorb the extra
workload associated with the additional resources.
To illustrate this idea, we propose models that are capable of generating heavy-tailed
growth rate distributions within the time series of a single ﬁrm. In Section 4 we consider the
special case of the propagation of employment growth throughout the various levels of a ﬁrm’s
hierarchy. The organization of production in a hierarchy is indeed a general feature of all
ﬁrms – in fact, in the Transaction-Cost-Economics literature, the words ‘ﬁrm’ and ‘hierarchy’
are used almost interchangeably. In this context, a ﬁrm may grow by adding an additional
worker on the factory shopﬂoor, who will require the attention of a supervisor. It may occur,
however, that all of the current supervisors are already too busy to take on this extra burden
of supervision. With a small probability, then, the addition of this supplementary worker
requires that the ﬁrm hire another supervisor. Furthermore, the addition of a supervisor may
5Penrose writes “[a]t all times there exist, within every ﬁrm, pools of unused productive services and these,
together with the changing knowledge of management, create a productive opportunity which is unique for
each ﬁrm.” (Penrose, 1960, p. 2). Similarly, Lesourne writes “L’entreprise cherchera ` a employer ces ressources
inutilis´ ees, mais en le faisant en cr´ eera d’autres, en ne r´ eussissant jamais ` a atteindre un ´ etat d’´ equilibre complet
dans l’utilisation de ses resources” (Lesourne, 1973, p. 92).
6A similar story could be imagined for growth after the arrival of an innovation, since the innovating ﬁrm
will typically have to invest in a wide range of complementary assets in order to proﬁt from the innovation








































8then increase the administrative workload of the central oﬃce, such that this latter also needs
to hire a supplementary worker. An analogy with the classic ‘sandpile’ model7 can therefore
be drawn, as the addition of a supplementary worker can lead to a ‘snowball eﬀect’ of hiring
of employees at higher levels of the hierarchy. We expand upon this model in Section 5, so
that our model consists not only of labour but also capital inputs.
3 Theoretical Foundations
The path-breaking book of Penrose (1959) is a milestone for research into the theory of the
ﬁrm. In this book, Penrose explains that ﬁrms are composed of ‘resources’ which are idiosyn-
cratic assets that are essential inputs into the productive process. Although Penrose’s book is
mainly concerned with human resources (in particular, the scarce resource that is managerial
talent), other authors have identiﬁed other examples of resources. Brand names, in-house
knowledge of technology, employment of skilled personnel, trade contracts, machinery, and ef-
ﬁcient procedures are other such examples (Wernerfelt (1984)). Montgomery (1994) suggests
that Disney’s cast of animated characters can be viewed as a resouce, that has been observed
to fuel diversiﬁcation. Somewhat more unusual is the aﬃrmation that even emotions such as
anger and frustration can be considered to be organization-speciﬁc ‘resources’ (Feldman, 2004,
p. 304). Furthermore, Winter (1995) comments on the similarity of the Penrosian concept of
‘resources’ and the evolutionary notion of ‘organizational routines’ and concludes that even
routines can be considered as resources.8
Proposition 1 Firms can be seen as being composed of resources
One of the major features of these resources is their indivisible nature. This was described
quite clearly by Penrose and has been recognized by many subsequent scholars. To summarize,
Garnsey writes “Penrose pointed out that many of the resources required for expansion are only
available in multiples that do not match up, as where new equipment creates excess capacity.
This creates incentives to exploit unused resources through further growth.” (Garnsey, 1998,
p. 539).
Proposition 2 These resources are discrete and indivisible
7See Bak and Chen (1991); see also Bak et al. (1993) for an economic application. In the ‘sandpile’ model,
grains of sand are dropped on top of each other until a sandpile is formed. “[R]andomly dropping on additional
sand will result in the slope of the pile increasing to a critical slope, at which point avalanches of all sizes
(limited only by the size of the pile) can occur in response to the dropping of a single additional grain of sand.”
(Bak et al. (1993) p. 7).
8Winter writes “routines clearly qualify as resources, given the expansive use of the term ‘resources’ in the
literature of the resource-based view. ...a routine in operation at a particular site can be conceived as a web








































8The indivisible resources that form the basis for a ﬁrm’s productive potential are not perfect
substitutes but they need to be combined in roughly constant proportions in order for the ﬁrm
to produce its output. As a consequence, ﬁrms strive to ﬁnd those combinations of resources
that reduce slack. Penrose describes this idea in these words: “[i]f a collection of indivisible
productive resources is to be fully used, the minimum level of output at which the ﬁrm must
produce must correspond to the least common multiple of the various maximum outputs
obtainable from the smallest unit in which each type of resource can be acquired.” (Penrose,
1959, p. 68). It follows that “[u]nused productive services are, for the enterprising ﬁrm, at the
same time a challenge to innovate [and] an incentive to expand ...” (Penrose, 1959, p. 85). In
other words, the resources in a ﬁrm are interdependent because, under circumstances where
ﬁrms strive for the most eﬃcient combination of resources, the addition of one indivisible
resource may well have consequences on the desirable levels of other resources.
Proposition 3 These resources are interdependent and subject to local interactions. This
may lead to non-linearities as ﬁrms add indivisible resources to arrive at an eﬃcient level of
production.
4 A Simpliﬁed Model
4.1 Intuition of the model
In the previous discussion, we argued that ﬁrms grow by adding discrete resources to a complex
of interdependent resources that they already possess. However, a verbal discussion is not
methodologically suﬃcient to prove our point that discrete, interdependent resources organized
within a ﬁrm bring about a Laplace distribution of growth rates. In this section, therefore, we
present an analytical model capable of reproducing the observed functional form by exploiting
a few simplifying assumptions. Our attempts to construct a formal model, it would appear,
receive the blessing of those who are concerned that the modelling of heavy-tailed phenomena
has received insuﬃcient attention in the literature (McKelvey and Andriani (2005)).
We characterize a ﬁrm as being composed of a relatively large number of hierarchies.9 The
bottom layer of the ﬁrm (i.e. the very lowest hierarchical level) is composed exclusively of
productive workers, whilst all of the other levels are composed of managers whose task is to
supervise either productive workers or subordinate managers (see Figure 2 for an illustration).
A ﬁrm grows by adding a productive worker. The number of managers is determined by the
9We do not need to deﬁne the number ‘large’ nor deﬁne what happens at the very top of the hierarchy.
Also, we do not need to suppose that the number of hierarchies tends to inﬁnity, because we only want to
explain the distribution of growth rates for a certain limited range. An implication of this assumption is that








































8Figure 2: An illustration of the underlying intuition of the model, where the span of control
is α=3. Depending upon the ‘criticality’ of the system, the addition of a productive worker
may lead to an increase in the number of supervisors further up the hierarchy. If there is some
slack in the system, a productive worker can be added and new supervisors need not be added
(see left). If, however, the attention of supervisors is already at full utilization, the addition
of a productive worker will require the addition of a supervisor (see right).
number of productive workers and also by limits on the eﬃcient span of control, α, which
correspond to the maximum number of subordinates that a manager can eﬀectively supervise.
“At executive levels [the span of control] is seldom less than three, and seldom more than ten,
and usually lies within narrower bounds – particularly if we take averages over all executives
in an organization at a given level.” (Simon, 1957, p. 32). In this model, though, we do
not need to attribute any speciﬁc numerical value to α and so we leave it in algebraic form.
It is computationally helpful, and also theoretically meaningful, however, to assume that α
is a whole number that is strictly greater than unity (i.e. α ∈ N+, α > 1). For analytical
simplicity, we assume that α is a constant and does not vary either within a hierarchical
level or across levels (for a discussion of the plausibility of this assumption, see Williamson
(1967) p. 128). For the purposes of this model, we also must assume that adjustment of
the ﬁrm’s hierarchical organization to additional productive workers occurs within one time
period. Finally, we assume that the ﬁrm is initially at a stable state, such that it is already
eﬃciently organized in the sense that it is not possible for it to employ fewer managers given
the number of productive workers and its given value of α (i.e. the limit on the eﬃcient span of
control). The reader may notice major similarities between the model developed here and the
executive compensation model of Simon (1957) and the information ﬂows model of Williamson
(1967). The fact that the same hierarchical model has been applied in quite diﬀerent contexts
lends credibility to its use here – indeed, we cannot be accused of having conclusions that
emerge from ad hoc modelling assumptions.
A summary understanding can be obtained by looking at Figure 2. Two important points
should be emphasized. First, there is a distinction between total production n and total








































8while total employment corresponds to the number of both productive workers and supervisors
combined, i.e. x. Second, it should be noted that we do not attempt to generalize on the
sources of growth opportunities, but rather we focus on how ﬁrms build upon given growth
opportunities.10 We argue that the fat-tailed distribution of growth rates does not come from
the distribution of opportunities available to ﬁrms, but rather on the reactions of ﬁrms to
growth stimuli. The model is admittedly a gross simpliﬁcation and does not take into account
such factors as the interdependence of growth rates between ﬁrms, ﬂexibility of α (the span
of control parameter), liquidity constraints that limit growth, or limits on the availability of
suitable workers. Nonetheless, its simplicity will make it clear to what properties we owe the
emergence of the distribution.
4.2 Formal model
Let us begin with the simplest possible case, considering one ﬁrm that grows by adding just
one productive worker (i.e. ∆n = 1). If new productive workers can be integrated without
having to add a supervisor, we have ∆n = ∆x; i.e. the number of productive workers added is
equal to change in total employment. It is possible, however, that all of the managers in the
second hierarchical level (i.e. those that supervise the productive workers) are already fully
occupied. This will occur when the number of productive workers (before adding the new
one) is exactly a multiple of α. If this is the case, the arrival of the supplementary worker
will require that one supplementary manager be hired at the next hierarchical level. This
scenario will occur with probability 1/α. However, the arrival of this new manager at the
second level may add to the workload of managers on the third hierarchical level, and so on.
The probability that the addition of a productive worker leads to at least two managers being
hired at two successive levels is 1/α × 1/α = 1/α2. We can continue with this reasoning to
end up with the following distribution of employment growth:
Prob.(∆x ≥ 1|∆n = 1) = 1
Prob.(∆x ≥ 2|∆n = 1) = 1/α
Prob.(∆x ≥ 3|∆n = 1) = 1/α2
...
and so on. Formally, we have an exponential distribution with the following functional
form:
P(∆x ≥ γ|∆n = 1) = α
1−γ (1)
10Our model is thus in line with the previous theoretical models of industrial structure and dynamics reviewed









































8Figure 3: The distribution of growth of total employment if a ﬁrm grows by ∆n = 1 (right
ﬁgure, see Result 1), or if a ﬁrm shrinks by ∆n = 1 (left ﬁgure, see Result 2).
or, expressed diﬀerently,
P(∆x = γ|∆n = 1) = α
1−γ(1 − 1/α) (2)
where γ is a positive integer (γ ≥ ∆n). We therefore observe that the distribution of total
employment growth (∆x) of a ﬁrm that grows by adding one productive worker will follow an
exponential distribution.
It is also possible to generalize for the case where a ﬁrm grows by adding ∆n ∈ N+
productive workers (with, of course, ∆x ≥ ∆n). For ∆n < α, we obtain the following
distribution:
P(∆x = γ|∆n) = 1 − ∆n/α if γ = ∆n
P(∆x = γ|∆n) = ∆n · α∆n−γ(1 − 1/α) if γ > ∆n (3)
where equation (2) corresponds to the special case where ∆n = 1.
Thus, we have:
Result 1 The distribution of growth of total employment of a ﬁrm that adds ∆n productive
workers will follow an exponential distribution.
An illustration is oﬀered in Figure 3 (right).
Analogical reasoning can be applied to the case where a ﬁrm shrinks in size. Consider
a ﬁrm that shrinks by ∆n units – at least one supervisor will no longer be needed when,
after shrinking, the number of productive workers is an exact multiple of α. Formally, we can
still use Equation (3), where a ﬁrm shrinks by ∆x employees as a response to shedding ∆n








































8P(∆x = γ|∆n) = 1 − ∆n/α if ∆x = ∆n
P(∆x = γ|∆n) = ∆n · α∆n−γ(1 − 1/α) if ∆x > ∆n (4)
Result 2 The distribution of growth of total employment of a ﬁrm that shrinks by ∆n pro-
ductive workers will follow an exponential distribution.
An illustration is given in Figure 3 (left).
Autocorrelation dynamics It is also possible to derive the conditional autocorrelation
dynamics of the ﬁrm’s growth dynamics. Consider the case where one production worker is
added in each period t, i.e. nt = nt−1 + 1. The conditional growth autocorrelation can be
written as:
P(xt − xt−1 > 1|xt−1 − xt−2 > 1) = 0




If the ﬁrm experienced a growth spurt in the previous period (i.e. xt−1−xt−2 > 1), it has a
probability of zero of repeating this growth performance in the following period. If, however,
the ﬁrm added a productive worker in the previous period but this did not trigger oﬀ the
addition of a supervisor, then the addition of a productive worker in this period has a positive
probability of leading to the further addition of a supervisor.
Given that E(xt − xt−1|xt−1 − xt−2 > 1) = 1 and E(xt − xt−1|xt−1 − xt−2 = 1) > 1, we
observe negative growth autocorrelation in the case where a growth spurt of x was triggered
in the previous period (i.e. when xt−1 − xt−2 > 1).
We will pursue our analysis of conditional autocorrelation proﬁles in Section 5.3.
4.3 Discussion
The model is admittedly far too simple to be realistic, yet it’s simplicity makes for greater
visibility of the source of the emergence of the symmetric exponential distribution. The model
can be seen as the simplest model in a family of possible models that view ﬁrms as coherent
collections of resources that are complementary and discrete. These latter are subject to
localised interactions and embedded in an organization that tends to a critical state of full
utilization of its resources. In this context, a small growth stimulus working through local








































8eﬀects. We argue that it is these properties that explain the emergence of the observed fat-
tailed growth rate distributions.
The model describes the dynamics of a single, ‘autistic’ organization and makes no attempt
to account for competitive interactions between ﬁrms. In our view, this is not a serious ﬂaw.
Other explanations of the fat-tailed growth rate distribution have emphasized the complex
nature of inter-ﬁrm competition as the source of the emergence of the observed distribution
(e.g. Bottazzi and Secchi (2006a), McKelvey and Andriani (2005)). Recent empirical work has
nonetheless cast doubt on the importance of inter-ﬁrm competition as a factor conditioning
ﬁrm growth rates. Sutton (2007) analyzes the dynamics of market shares of the largest and
second largest ﬁrms in a number of Japanese industries, and ﬁnds (perhaps surprisingly) that
their market share dynamics can be modeled as statistically independent. Only in the case
where the combined market share of an industry’s two largest ﬁrms is at least 90% of the
industry total does inter-ﬁrm competition leave a detectable statistical footprint. Geroski and
Gugler (2004) consider the impact of the growth of rival ﬁrms on a ﬁrm’s employment growth,
using a database on several thousand of the largest ﬁrms in 14 European countries. Rival ﬁrms
are deﬁned as other ﬁrms in the same 3-digit industry. In their main regression results (their
Table 2) they are unable to detect any signiﬁcant eﬀect of rival’s growth on ﬁrm growth,
although they do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect in speciﬁc industries (i.e. diﬀerentiated
good industries and advertising intensive industries). In our model, it is the complex nature
of interactions between the resources within a ﬁrm, rather than the competitive struggle
between ﬁrms, that accounts for the emergence of the observed growth rates distribution.
Some caveats of the model should nonetheless be mentioned. First, the model only consid-
ers the case of employment growth and does not consider other aspects of ﬁrm growth (such
as growth of sales or growth of ﬁxed capital). Second, all of the interactions take place in
a vertical direction (up or down the hierarchical channels) rather than in a horizontal direc-
tion. The model therefore places strict limits on the nature of interactions that is probably
not a realistic portrayal of how a ﬁrm’s resources interact. Third, the addition of an extra
production worker at the bottom of the hierarchy is assumed to lead to a modiﬁcation of total
employment that is, if anything, instantaneous. This might not be an accurate assumption,
however, considering that: “[t]here is a considerable time lag between the growth of numbers
of production workers and the expansion in employment of other personnel” (McGuire, quoted
in Starbuck (1971) p. 54). Fourth, the model is very simple – this is both an advantage and








































85 Extending the Model
The previous model had many limitations, as we have already discussed. In an attempt to
improve the model, we now try to develop it into something more realistic by introducing
capital as a factor of production. Whereas the previous model consisted of productive workers
and supervisors, here we include in an analogous fashion machines and production plants, with
the restriction that each production plant can house a limited number of machines. We also
introduce a further input which serves as a ‘numeraire’, which combines productive labour
and machines in order to produce the ﬁnal good. For the sake of simplicity, we do not allow
for any substitution between labour and capital in the production of the ﬁnal good, although
this could be relaxed in further work.
The following model serves as a useful illustration of the growth mechanism. Due to
diﬃculties in applying optimization algorithms to cases involving integer restrictions, however,
we are prevented from ﬁrmly establishing the sensitivity of the model to diﬀerent parameter
settings. As such, the model is at a preliminary stage and should be seen primarily as an aid
to intuition.
5.1 Introducing the Model
Consider a ﬁrm’s production Q that is produced from N inputs in the following way:
Q = f(A,B,...,N) (6)
Equation (6) implies that production of ﬁnal goods requires many inputs. These inputs
are lumpy and indivisible. In reality, there are many such indivisible inputs to a production
process, In the present model, however, we limit ourselves to the ﬁve inputs mentioned above.
In this example we envisage that A corresponds to the basic raw materials required for a
‘production run’, B to the number of production employees, C to the number of ‘machines’,
D to the number of supervisors (non-production workers), and E to the number of production
plants. It is also meaningful to restrict the values of these inputs to integer number values,
i.e. (A,B,C,D,E) ∈ N+.
The production function has the following functional form:
Q = f(A,B,C,D,E) (7)












































8where Min(.) is the function that selects the minimum from the list of values in parentheses.
The DIV operator corresponds to integer division, whereby the result is integer and any
remainder is discarded.11 Integer division eﬀectively helps us to model the indivisible nature
of the inputs.
The rB coeﬃcient (with rB < 1) corresponds to the requirements of input B into the
production process. Strictly speaking, rB corresponds to the number of units of B required
for one unit of A. In other words, a production run requires not only raw materials but also
the labour services of an employee. Analogous interpretations exist for the rC, rD, and rE
coeﬃcients.
Using a similar reasoning to that developed in Section 4, it follows that the addition of one
more production run has an (unconditional) probability of rB of resulting in the addition of a
production worker, as well as an (unconditional) probability of rC of resulting in the addition
of a machine. In turn, any additional employee may lead to the addition of a supervisor, and
any extra machine may lead to the construction of a new production plant.
It is thus apparent that the marginal costs of adding one more production run depend
upon the ‘criticality’ of the system. In some cases, there is enough ‘slack’ to accommodate
the production run without any repercussions. In other cases, adding a production run results
in cascading investments throughout the organization. In what follows, we will observe how
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms decide whether or not to satisfy marginal changes in demand with
additional production runs, depending upon the ‘criticality’ of the organization of the ﬁrm’s
productive inputs. As such, the ﬁrm’s marginal cost depends upon the criticality of the system.
A ﬁrm’s cost function can be written as:






Where cA is the cost to the ﬁrm of input A, and where analogous deﬁnitions hold for cB,
cC, cD, and cE.




P · Q − COST (9)
subject to given demand conditions. For simplicity, we consider a downward-sloping de-
mand curve which corresponds to the case of imperfect competition:12
11In other words, the result of B DIV rB is the integer obtained when B is divided by rB and any remainder
is thrown away. For example, 7 DIV 2 is the integer 3.
12If we assume that the conditions of demand are those of perfect competition (i.e. that price is given) then
ﬁrms face no scale eﬀects and the model in its present form does not rule out inﬁnite increases in size. In








































8P = h(Q) = β − φQ (10)
where β and φ are parameters.
5.2 A quantitative example
In this section we will consider the case with ﬁve inputs: A,B,C,D and E.






β · Min(A,B DIV rB,C DIV rC,D DIV rD,E DIV rE)
−φ · Min(A,B DIV rB,C DIV rC,D DIV rD,E DIV rE)
2





This problem is obviously too complex to solve analytically. To our knowledge, it is also too
diﬃcult to solve using standard optimization software, because the integer restrictions (brought
on by integer division) pose serious problems to conventional optimization algorithms.
To ﬁnd the maximum, it seems necessary to adopt a ‘brute force’ approach. We will
attempt to cycle through all possible combinations of the (‘reasonable’) integer values for the
inputs and then select out the combinations of inputs that bring about proﬁt maximization.13
The proﬁt-maximizing input sets are then recorded, and the time series will subsequently
analyzed.
We now observe how the ﬁrm responds to changes in its market environment. This is
modelled by seeing how the ﬁrm reacts to changes in the demand parameter β. Changes
in β can either stem from exogenous market developments or from the ﬁrm’s own activity
(e.g. advertising), and could correspond to the arrival of business opportunities assumed in
the ‘islands models’ literature (Ijiri and Simon (1977), Sutton (1998), Bottazzi and Secchi
(2006a)).
We therefore propose that demand follows the following simple growth process:
which ﬁrms can instantly and costlessly experience implausibly large increases in size. To this end one might
introduce the existence of some sort of adjustment costs.
13Cycling though all possible combinations would be extraordinarily computationally intensive. For example,
if we allow variables A − E to take any value from 0 to 100, we end up with 1005 = 1010 combinations. For
this reason, we restrict ourselves to ‘reasonable values’ of the inputs. In choosing the initial conditions, we
choose values for the inputs that are relatively close to the values obtained from optimization when the integer
constraint is relaxed. If the values for any of the the inputs are on the bounds of the initial restrictions,
we vary the possible values for the inputs accordingly. As demand increases, we assume the corresponding








































8Figure 4: Distribution of growth rates of output Q. Note the log scale on the y axis.
βt+1 = (1.01)βt (12)
which corresponds to a demand growth of 1% in each period t.
Given this dynamic demand, we will now observe the growth series of the proﬁt-maximizing
levels of inputs and total production. We will then observe the distribution of the resultant
growth rates.
There is not much theoretical guidance available to help us with our parametrization.
Concerning the input requirements, we assume: rA = 1, rB = 0.14, rC = 0.09, rD = 0.022,
rE = 0.003. This implies that one production plant can eﬃciently house up to about 7
supervisors, about 30 machines, about 45 production workers and about 330 units of raw
materials (corresponding to 330 production runs). Concerning the cost functions, we posit:
cA = 21, cB = 26, cC = 34, cD = 74, cE = 310.
5.3 Properties of the Model
We now investigate some properties of the model. As is standard practice in simulation








































8Table 1: Cumulative distributions of the growth rate series.
≥ 0 ≥ 0.01 ≥ 0.02 ≥ 0.04 ≥ 0.08
Growth of output (Q) 100 30 25 10 2
Employment growth (B and D combined) 100 30 26 11 2
Growth of machines (C) 100 23 23 14 2
we discard the ﬁrst 50 periods and focus on the last 100 observations only.
5.3.1 Growth rates distribution
We consider ﬁrst the distribution of growth rates. Table 1 presents some statistics on the
cumulative distributions of some of the growth rate series. These results provide evidence of
fat tails in the growth rate densities of output, employment, and machines.14 Figure 4 shows
the distribution of growth rates of output. This ﬁgure provides further evidence on the fat
tails of the growth rates distribution.
5.3.2 Autocorrelation of growth rates
Many studies, although not all, have found small negative autocorrelation in ﬁrm growth
rates.15 Autocorrelation coeﬃcients from simple AR regressions are presented in Table 2.
Regressions are performed using either OLS or least absolute deviation (LAD) techniques. OLS
regressions suggest that, if anything, there is a mild negative autocorrelation, although median
regressions (i.e. the LAD regressions) do not detect any autocorrelation. These simulated
results are thus similar to the ﬁndings in Bottazzi et al. (2008) and Coad (2006) where growth
rate autocorrelation is strongly negative on average (using OLS which calculates the ‘average
eﬀect’) whilst growth rate autocorrelation for the median ﬁrm (using LAD which calculates
the ‘median eﬀect’) is much closer to zero.
Coad (2007) presents a more detailed analysis of conditional growth rate autocorrelation
using quantile autoregression techniques, which explore how growth rate autocorrelation varies
over the conditional distribution of growth rates. Whilst for the average ﬁrm, growth rate
autocorrelation is not so important, it is very important for the fast growth ﬁrms. Fast growth
ﬁrms are quite unlikely to repeat their performance in the following year. As a result, the AR
coeﬃcient becomes very negative for these ﬁrms. Similarly, an analogous phenomenon aﬀects
extreme negative growth ﬁrms. The empirically observed autoregression proﬁle is shown in
the left panel in Figure 5. The right panel in Figure 5 shows a quantile autoregression plot
for our simulated data. We view the comparison of these plots to be a (small) success story.
14Note that we do not report the results for growth of proﬁts, because this series has a strong trending
component, which comes from the nature of demand growth.








































8Figure 5: Quantile autoregression plots. Left: empirical quantile autoregression proﬁle for
sales growth, for ﬁrms with non-negative sales growth rates (source: author’s elaboration
based on Coad (2007) Figure 3 under the restriction of non-negative sales growth). Right:
quantile autoregression proﬁle of output growth for the simulated model. Both graphs show
the variation in the coeﬃcient on lagged growth of proﬁts over the conditional quantiles of the
growth rate distribution. Conditional quantiles (on the x-axis) range from 0 (for ﬁrms expe-
riencing zero growth) to 1 (for the fastest-growing ﬁrms). Conﬁdence intervals extend to 95%
conﬁdence intervals in either direction (right: conﬁdence intervals obtained after 1000 boot-
strap replications). Horizontal lines represent OLS estimates with 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Graphs made using the ‘grqreg’ Stata module (Azevedo (2004)).
Table 2: Autocorrelation of growth rates of output.
Coeﬃcient t-stat R2 obs
(robust) OLS -0.1102 -1.41 0.0122 100
LAD 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 100
Whilst most ﬁrms experience no growth rate autocorrelation, it is the fastest growing ﬁrms
(at the upper quantiles) that experience much stronger forces of negative autocorrelation. If
a ﬁrm has just experienced widespread organizational growth, it is unlikely that it will grow
in the following period. For such ﬁrms, growth can be accommodated by slack capacity.
5.3.3 Scaling of growth rate variance with size
Most studies into ﬁrm growth (but not all) have observed that the variance of growth rates
decreases with ﬁrm size.16 Table 3 presents some evidence in this direction. When we split the
sample into two groups according to size, the standard deviation decreases slightly (from 0.0221
to 0.0180). This has an intuitive explanation in the context of our model. The indivisibilities
are larger with respect to a small ﬁrm’s size than large ﬁrm’s size, so smaller ﬁrms have a
more ‘jagged’, erratic growth proﬁle.
16A negative dependence of growth rate variance on size has been found in data on US manufacturing
ﬁrms (Amaral et al. (1997); Bottazzi and Secchi (2003a)), for ﬁrms in the worldwide pharmaceutical industry
(Bottazzi and Secchi (2006b)), and, to a lesser extent, for French manufacturing ﬁrms Bottazzi et al. (2008).








































8Table 3: Scaling of variance with ﬁrm size.
Mean size (Q) Mean growth rate Standard Deviation Obs.
First 50 periods 184.18 0.012 0.0221 50
Second 50 periods 321.22 0.010 0.0180 50
6 Conclusion
We began this paper by observing that the distributions of growth rates of ﬁrms are distributed
according to the Laplace distribution (also known as the symmetric exponential distribution).
We then attempted to explain this emergent property. We acknowledge that there are many
possible explanations for empirically observed regularities (Simon (1968)), especially for un-
conditional objects such as growth rate distributions (Brock (1999)). We therefore tried to
base the assumptions of our model on theoretical descriptions of ﬁrm growth. While the
Bottazzi and Secchi (2006a) model emphasizes competition between ﬁrms, our model focuses
on the internal structure of business organizations to model the time series development of a
single ﬁrm.
We drew upon insights from the resource-based view of the ﬁrm (Penrose (1959)) in order
to present a class of models of ﬁrm growth. We viewed a ﬁrm as a coherent collection of
complementary, discrete resources, that are subject to localised interactions, embedded in an
organization that tends to a critical state of full utilization of resources. The lumpy nature of
resources within a ﬁrm implies that ﬁrm expansion is characterized by nonconstant marginal
costs that depend upon the degree of utilization of the ﬁrm’s resources. In this context, a
small stimulus working through local interaction channels can be transmitted throughout a
ﬁrm to produce potentially large-scale eﬀects.
In our ﬁrst model we considered employment growth in the case of a hierarchical organi-
zation, in which a limit has been placed on the eﬃcient span of control. We do not attempt
to generalize upon where growth opportunities come from, but instead we consider how ﬁrms
build upon growth opportunities. Adding an extra worker at the bottom of the hierarchy
will marginally increase the workload at higher levels of the hierarchy, which may trigger
oﬀ to a potentially large hiring of supervisors. It is observed that a ﬁrm’s growth rate of
total employment (productive workers and supervisors combined) will follow an exponential
distribution.
Our second model was an attempt to extend the early model, by introducing ﬁxed capital
into the model. This model was capable of explaining a number of ‘stylised facts’ about
ﬁrm growth, such as the heavy-tailed growth rates distribution, the peculiar shape of the
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